DEAL
OR NO
DEAL?
An article for
Eurofacts
by New Alliance
The UK faces some challenging Brexit negotiations,
aggravated by questions over Parliamentary stability. However best practice
identified in a commercial negotiating manual provides many pointers that
Britain will secure a deal with the EU.
µ Pre-election rhetoric suggests that the
tone of the negotiation might be ‘competitive’
(i.e. hostile). Much of it will actually be about co-operation on matters of common interest like trade, travel, security,
etc.
µ Power is more balanced
than some would say. We might buy more from the EU than vice-versa, but
proportionately have more to lose on trade. However needlessly damaging a major
customer will harm supply chains, EU exporters and EU nationals working in the
UK and sending money home.
Over 50% of UK shares are now owned by
international investors. EU holdings in the UK are worth around £500bn. During last September’s G20 meeting, Japanese
businesses and government demanded Single Market-type access be maintained by
both sides.
Some interests in the EU have been
tempted to use the negotiations to seize business from the UK, for instance in
aviation and Euro clearing. However various authorities have replied why this
would be counter-productive.
µ Having previously outsourced trade
negotiations to the EU, the UK government now has some experienced negotiators available. These include Peter Hill, who
worked for former EU Trade Commissioner Mandelson, and Crawford Falconer, who
worked for the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
µ Policy on both sides is for
free trade. This is obviously not absolute - the EU won’t suddenly complete the
single market or open up sensitive defence procurement. However it is bound by various
international agreements that commit towards trade liberalisation, stability
and not raising barriers.
The
EU is a keen supporter of the WTO whose rules allow regional unions (such as
the EU) as a means of easing trade between members, but not to raise barriers to
trade. In fact, they must avoid creating adverse effects upon other WTO
members.
WTO Director-General Robert Azevedo
predicted that the UK would not suffer trade setbacks during or after its
negotiations with the EU.
µ There is plenty of incentive for both sides to reach an agreement – if just because
they will have to live together as neighbours. The UK could be a major ally in
defence and security, so long as its economy is not crashed. It could also be a
substantial makeweight in future joint trade deals?
The global economy is so interlinked
that failure to reach a viable deal will affect wider economic confidence and
stock markets. In the EU, exposed economies like the Irish Republic and Spain
would take a hit, with likely local backlash against EU interests – just before
the 2019 European Parliament elections.
A botched deal could see the Euro and
Sterling hit, with safe haven currencies like the Yen suddenly soaring, hitting
wider currency and export stability.
µ Another factor is the view of the EU’s
‘social partners’.
ETUC represents EU-wide trade unions. Employers’
bodies include Business Europe (‘a CBI’), UEAPME
(representing SMEs) and CEEP (representing public service providers). Seen as influential stakeholders, they wish to avoid
austerity and damage to Europe’s workers and companies.
µ Some worry about the European Parliament suddenly rejecting the
deal at the end of negotiations. However, it is represented in them and will
have regular updates, just as the various EU institutions regularly confer with
each other. The major political groups in the European Parliament (and the
European Council) share the social partners’ concern about promoting free trade
and avoiding austerity. This makes a surprise at the end unlikely.
µ The EU and UK will start negotiations with
some diverging and conflicting positions, but remember
that demands tend to be padded so that compromises
are seen to be made. Spain has already gone back on the EU ‘demand’ over
Gibraltar. In practice, there will be a lot of common ground (e.g. on expat rights), so expect positions to converge.
µ Despite pre-election rhetoric to appear ‘tough’, it has long
been seen that May will play safe and trim to a position that can be pushed
through Parliament under tight timescales. This indicates arrangements very similar
to being in the Single Market (EEA) as a fallback
while the ideal of moving to a
bespoke Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) is worked on as arrangements
stabilise. In March, Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief negotiator, appeared to be
leading the UK in the direction of EEA membership as the Brexit option with the
least disruption.
Threatening to walk-away was part of
that rhetoric. However neither side wants ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ that ‘no deal’ would provide. You
can bet there will be a deal, even if
it’s part agreement, part provisionally keeping respective ships afloat while talks
continue.
µ Negotiations are often about saving face, getting a deal that can be
sold to key audiences. The UK might, for
example, get better trade terms in exchange for saving the EU a budget shortfall
before 2021. Except it wouldn’t be billed as a cave-in, at
least in the UK. It might be portrayed as a goodwill gesture to have a
joint ‘Brexit adjustment fund’?
Other areas of ‘compromise’ short term might be over accepting EU standards and
judgments (which the UK might do anyway in ‘nationalising’ EU laws), or free
movement of people. Theresa May has refused to guarantee less EU immigration,
consistent with keeping EU citizens’ ‘acquired rights’.
µ Attitudes to paying the EU vary from
‘they’re getting nothing’ (apart from for joining in specific programmes) to
‘£60bn is peanuts to pay for winning back our priceless democracy’. The EU is
already preparing for economies after 2021 in its budget, which might reveal
the real expectation. However with
Germany’s election coming, Angela Merkel and the EU will not want to be seen as
saddling Germany with extra contributions. We can expect a harder line
short-term.
As an alternative to direct payments, the
UK might gesture on recycling saved
payments into projects of common interest concerning defence or tackling
irregular migration?
µ A successful negotiation is one where both sides can claim some success at the end, even if some
concessions leave bruises! Experienced
negotiators will recognise that the other party will need to maintain its image too, and they will
not seek to humiliate.
Earlier
perceptions that the EU might want to ‘punish’ the UK to deter it or others
from leaving have been overplayed. Its luminaries might have been releasing
tensions immediately after the referendum shock, and the line taken since has
typically been more conciliatory as heads cool. The FT’s Wolfgang Münchau saw little
evidence that any other member state currently wants to follow the UK out of
the EU, and failed to see a single insurmountable obstacle to a deal.
European
Council President Donald Tusk has quipped that Brexit is ‘punishment enough’ as
the UK copes with some upheaval.
µ There are already outline solutions to
some identified problems. The EU can give legal exceptions (derogations) on
border measures which might ease the Irish situation. The WTO ‘waiver’ system might
allow provisional preferential trade agreements to run for a couple of years
should there be difficulties (e.g. time-wise) in finalising what is necessarily
a complex deal. The experience of the EU deal with Canada (CETA) is that much
of the wider agreement can be worked to provisionally while it is being
ratified.
µ The Lisbon Treaty focuses the EU
towards the vision of ‘an area of prosperity’ marked by cooperation with
neighbouring countries.
Lord
(Paddy) Ashdown sees the UK getting a tailored Norway-like deal with a work
permit system. He’s not just a Lib Dem peer, he’s President of the European
Movement federalists in the UK.
http://www.newalliance.org.uk/ref617.htm#_Brexit_Negotiations
has references used for this article
This
page updated: 21 June 2017